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11 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Discussion with [ ] by [ ] and [ ]  
on 9 May 1950.

1. [ ] and I discussed [ ] 5167 with [ ] made the following observations:

a) The two colonels evidently referred to [ ] and [ ] since [ ] does not represent himself to be a colonel.

b) Kupi could not have been fully informed on BKI intelligence activities in Northern Albania as the result of information furnished by OPC because OPC has not been fully informed. As I recall, his statement in this connection is correct. The only information OPC has regarding the current CHARITY operations is the more or less general comments made at a meeting some months ago at which Mr. Angleton and I were present, but I do not recall the OPC representatives who were present.

c) In connection with Kupi's allegation that the English favored admission of the BKI but that the American Colonel still opposed, [ ] commented again that there is no American colonel who has been recently connected with OPC-FAC; that he recalled something about a report on British comments favoring BKI admission, other than our report of a few weeks ago on this subject; that he would see what he could find in their files on the matter; that the State Department is opposed to BKI admission, but that the principal reason BKI is not admitted is the committee itself. He said he suspected that if the committee wanted BKI admitted, this would be done.

I asked [ ] specifically who in State opposed BKI admission. He said numerous State officials opposed the admission, including Mr. Thompson. The list he named did not include Mr. McKisson on the Albanian political desk nor Peters. It was pointed out to [ ] that he knew Peters was very much opposed to BKI and that there was a question in my mind as to how much he had influenced State policy by his private source reporting. [ ] did not know, however, he commented that the weekly summaries now received from State contain mostly analysis of CIA reports, and Peters' private source material is noticeably absent.

We had some discussion relative to the desirability of admitting BKI and possibly the KOSSOVAR group, but nothing of particular interest was developed. [ ] will advise us the results of the search of his files relative to a report, or reports, concerning the British favoring admission of the BKI.

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d) COMMENTS:

It is the opinion of [ ] and myself that Kupi's comments were either a fishing expedition on his part or an effort to keep the waters muddy between the BKI, FAC, British and U.S. There does not appear to be any basis for believing that OPC has informed Kupi concerning our operations. It is my opinion that we could prepare a paper which would practically force OPC to take a representative from the BKI and the KOSSOVARs into the committee. This paper could point out the following factors:

1. The BKI is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, opposition group.

2. It has intelligence and operational potentialities which cannot be ignored, and unless included in the committee, will undoubtedly align itself with the French, Greeks or Italians.

3. Whether they like it or not, if operations start in Albania they cannot keep the BKI out either during the operations or out of the government if the revolution is successful.

4. We have proved that the BKI has a following in Albania. To date the FAC has not proved that the BKI has such a following.

5. If the BKI is brought into the FAC, we could make peace with the Italians (as regards the FAC and Albania).

6. The KOSSOVARs represent an operational group which is not as significant as the BKI, but nevertheless has assets which can be used.

7. One of the principal objections to the KOSSOVARs is Deva and his record. We have a KOSSOVAR (who could be a very forceful candidate with the committee), namely Liddell, of proved loyalty and integrity, who could represent the KOSSOVARs and be very acceptable to Dosti and to Zog. As a matter of fact, Liddell might well be the solution of bringing the FAC together into a workable organization, representing all groups. The Zogists would be friendly towards the BKI and towards him. He is a KOSSOVAR (from that region); is friendly with the BKIs and above all is loyal to the U.S. We could further point out that if the above course of action is followed, the Greeks, Italians and French will be stymied insofar as the formation of a separate committee of any prominence or influence, or the mounting of separate operations of very great significance. Would you like for me to prepare a draft of a memorandum along these lines for your consideration?

*yes [unclear]  
it would be very [unclear]*

Chief, FDP

cc: STA

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